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Abstract 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) existed as a peaceful country from its inception 
following World War II until its dissolution which began in the late 1980s. By 1992, the country 
ceased to exist, and wars had erupted throughout several former Yugoslav republics. In order to 
determine how these events unfolded, this paper first seeks to analyze ethnic relations in Yugoslavia 
following Tito’s death and secondly, how the deterioration among the country’s ethnic groups led to 
war in the early 1990s. Using path dependency theory, this paper analyzes the changes in political 
leadership with case studies of three Yugoslav republics and the Semi-Autonomous Region of 
Kosovo, and how these chains of events led to war. The shift from Titoist to nationalist leadership 
conveys how the environment in Yugoslavia became predisposed to war. However, this paper 
concludes that path dependency theory cannot fully explain how war broke out, as it does not 
incorporate human emotions. Therefore, path dependency theory will be complemented by 
schismogenesis and armed mobilization theory to explain the shift from an environment predisposed 
to war to one engaged in civil war. 
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I. Introduction: 
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a multi-ethnic state that existed 
from the end of World War II to 1992. Following separatist movements that occurred in 
Slovenia and Croatia in 1991, the country erupted in civil war, which spilled into neighboring 
Bosnia-Herzegovina more violently in 1992 and in Kosovo in 1999. The Yugoslav Wars 
were unprecedented in that violent conflict had returned to Europe for the first time since 
World War II, which had ended 46 years earlier. Not only were the wars unprecedented in a 
European sense, but also in a Yugoslavian one. While ethnic tensions did exist prior to the 
break up of Yugoslavia, Yugoslavians had lived in peace for decades until the onset of war in 
1991.  
 
Research Topic: My research will focus on the historical background of ethnic relations 
during the final years of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito era of 
the 1980s and early 1990s. These ethnic relations will be examined in how they fueled 
nationalism and the role they played in the Balkan Wars, which began in 1991. This paper 
will build upon the path dependency theory, which in this paper seeks to follow the shift from 
peace to violence in Yugoslavia. While this social theory explains the political evolution in 
Yugoslavia, path dependency theory on its own cannot explain Yugoslavia’s descent into 
violence. Therefore, the political conditions that were created via the path dependency theory 
will be complemented by the schismogenesis and armed mobilization theories that 
incorporate human emotions in explaining the violence that occurred. 
 
Research Question: If Yugoslavia had existed as a peaceful country for several decades, 
what then could have caused such a sudden transformation from a peaceful society to one 
engaged in violent conflict? Furthermore, how was ethnic identity used specifically to 
mobilize war in Yugoslavia?  
 
Significance: The history of Yugoslavia before the Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s goes largely 
untold. This presents a fundamental problem in understanding how the violence could have 
begun in 1991. Without a clear understanding of the ethnic relations before the wars, it 
creates a skewed perception of the past that Yugoslavian society was predisposed to war. 
This paper seeks to gain a deeper understanding of Yugoslavia and the factors that could have 
led to violent conflict. The theories presented in this paper could offer insight into the factors 
the cause civil wars more generally. 
 
II. Literature Review: Various social theories and sources will be analyzed and tested in this 
paper to determine which theories most accurately convey how violence broke out in 
Yugoslavia. The three social theories under review in this paper are path dependency theory, 
schismogenesis, and armed mobilization. 
 Maria Koinova’s path dependency theory will be examined and built upon in this 
paper. Her book Ethnonationalist Conflict in Postcommunist States develops the notion of the 
path dependence theory in the context of how events were able to occur in the Balkans in the 
1990s. As much of this paper will analyze, the social theory posited in her book provides a 
sound basis to how the political conditions developed differently throughout the Yugoslav 
republics, but it falls short in explaining the final stage of violence that broke out. Therefore, 
the path dependency theory will be complemented with schismogenesis and armed 
mobilizations theories that together provide the missing pieces of the puzzle. 
 Contributor to Neighbors at War, Bette Dennich, points to distortion through the mass 
media as one of the primary mechanisms to mobilize the population into war. The author 
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builds onto the phenomenon known as “schismogenesis”, a theory developed by Gregory 
Bateson, which suggests that media can create an “us” versus “them” environment. The 
creation of this toxic and distorted environment creates a skewed perception by the public and 
how this mindset develops towards negativity to other groups in society and sees them based 
on their perceptions rather than reality. The other group then becomes a threat and the “us” 
group the victim (Dennich 2000 47-48). This paper will analyze significant moments in the 
media and the amount of violence that erupted as a result. Popular perceptions by 
Yugoslavian citizens will also be analyzed. Neighbors at War also builds on the 
schismogenesis theory with the observation of Yugoslavians’ reactions to major political 
events that played out in the mass media. 
 Empirical data will also be analyzed throughout to determine what surveys indicated 
in regards to feelings held by the public throughout Yugoslavia. The Myth of Ethnic War uses 
statistical data from Yugoslavian surveys to determine how against or in favor the public was 
toward war. Lastly, areas with more violence will be compared with the degree of tolerance 
that was indicated in the surveys to see if any correlations exist. This will draw upon theories 
stated by guest speaker Stefano Costalli that ethnic conflict was prevalent in more ethnically 
heterogeneous areas. 
 Historical data and original sources from the time period will also be analyzed to find 
what clues can be found in original footage and print in the period leading up to the war. 
These sources should be able to provide a first-hand look into the time period to see if 
Yugoslavian society was becoming increasingly violent.  
 
III. Thesis: The violence that occurred in the Balkans in the 1990s is less attributable to 
preexisting ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, but rather a concerted effort manipulated by 
nationalist government elites to fulfill their own agenda. Key electoral events enabled the rise 
of nationalist leaders who propagated ethnic disunity, which then led to armed mobilization. 
 
Hypothesis: Yugoslav republics that shifted to nationalist leadership in the final years of the 
SFRY developed a higher degree of schismogenesis, and consequently more armed 
mobilization and violence, than in Yugoslav republics lacking the shift to nationalist 
leadership. 
 
IV. Methodology: To determine the validity of my thesis, I will first do historical 
background research to examine the ethnic relations among Yugoslavia’s ethnic groups in the 
post-Tito era of the 1980s and early 1990s. The empirical data provided by Yugoslav citizens 
will indicate the societal attitudes held at the time and the degree to which societal attitudes 
alone can explain the descent into violence.  
 Second, as stated in the introduction, path dependency theory will be then used to 
study the correlation between political changes in Yugoslavia and the degree of violence. The 
path dependency is based off four case studies. The case studies presented in the paper are the 
wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Third, the role of 
schismogenesis will be analyzed by finding correlations between propaganda in media and 
ethnic violence. Fourth, Stefan Costelli’s armed mobilization theory will examine the final 
stage of the conflict, which moves from ethnic conflict to violence and civil war. 
 The overall assessment of ethnic relations in Yugoslavia will provide a clearer 
understanding of Yugoslavian society before the war. This assessment on Yugoslav society 
will then be applied in observing correlations between significant historical events and 
incidents of violence that occurred in the country. These observations should be able to 
provide a way to measure the degree of violence that occurred in Yugoslavia. 
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 To contrast with societal opinions in Yugoslavia, I will examine actions taken by 
government elites to determine whether or not these actions were a stronger factor in the 
violence that broke out beginning in 1991.  
 
V: Analysis of Ethnic Identity in Yugoslavia  
 In 1986, delegations of Serbs living Kosovo complained to the federal government of 
unfavorable living conditions and discrimination by the Albanian majority living in the 
autonomous region of Kosovo. This event gained little coverage nationwide (Dennich 46). 
However, the discontent among Serbs living in Kosovo gained media attention a year later 
when Slobodan Milosevic denounced the treatment of Serbian Kosovar demonstrators 
outside a meeting in Kosovo on ethnic tensions in the region (46-47). Serbian nationalists had 
actually staged the entire event by throwing rocks at the police first and then claiming that 
they were being attacked by the police. Milosevic then condemned the attacks on camera 
which was then broadcasted across Serbia (Percy, 11:45-13:15). 
 Statistics from the 1980s in Serbia debunked many of the preconceived notions that 
ethnic Albanians were pushing Serbs out of the province, as they migrated for other reasons, 
or that Serbs were disproportionately victims of crimes committed by Albanian Kosovars 
(Lazic 1995, 71). Although these statistics showed a decline in the Serb population in 
Kosovo, the statistics could easily be misrepresented by Serbian nationalists. This situation 
illustrates that the ethnic tensions which may have existed in Kosovo were distorted and 
manipulated by Serbian nationalists to pursue their own political agenda. Using the example 
of the Serbian Kosovars who petitioned in 1986, which received little media attention, in 
contrast to the widely covered “attack” on demonstrators a year later, media played a major 
role in how citizens reacted to the events. Citizens across Yugoslavia did not pay much 
attention to the ethnic tensions or discrimination in Kosovo prior to this, but when a national 
figurehead decried the events, it changed the perception that Yugoslavians had toward ethnic 
tension in Yugoslavia. 
 The Myth of Ethnic War takes a microhistory approach in determining Yugoslav 
attitudes in the late 1980s and early 1990s and the public’s likelihood to support war. Voter 
data from 1990 indicates that, just one year before war broke out in Croatia, voters were more 
concerned about the economy than ethnic conflicts (Gagnon 2004, 35). Voting data also 
indicates that Serbs living in Croatia voted in large numbers for the League of Communists of 
Croatia (SKH) over the Serbian nationalist party (35). This data is astonishing in that it 
illustrates how little Serb Croatians were motivated to vote along ethnic lines. Surveys 
conducted in 1989 even showed that the vast majority of respondents in both the Croat and 
Serb communities in Croatia felt that ethnic relations in their communities were good (35). 
When the same respondents were asked about ethnic relations on the national level, their 
responses indicated the exact opposite. The majority of Croatians felt that ethnic relations in 
Yugoslavia were mostly negative (36). The ethnic tensions in Kosovo that had gained 
national attention were likely what came to mind to many of the respondents (36). Although 
the majority of Croatians felt that ethnic relations were good, the media attention that 
amplified the situation in Kosovo most likely gave Croatians the impressions that ethnic 
relations were bad for the most part outside of their republic. More data indicates that Serb 
and Croat residents were adamantly apposed to changing the education system into one based 
on ethnic lines (38). 
 Data from Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1989 also provides striking findings that are in 
complete antithesis to the violence that broke out there three years later. Over three-quarters 
of young Bosnians felt that there was no need to display “caution” towards other ethnic 
groups and nearly the same percentage of respondents felt that “division into nations is 
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harmful or pointless” (Gagnon 2004, 40). When examining the data in Serbia, the data 
supplied by the respondents is much more pessimistic. Only a fifth of respondents felt that 
ethnic relations in Serbia were good (44). “According to the findings “…there is little 
evidence to support the contention that violence, ethnic cleansing, and a nationalist state were 
the top priorities for people in Serbia” (44). The author notes, “[a]gain, as elsewhere, the 
impressions of relations at levels higher than those experienced in everyday life are very 
heavily influenced by media coverage, which in this period was very much emphasizing the 
negative” (44). While Serbs living in Serbia provided a more negative outlook on the ethnic 
situation in their republic, their data also shares a commonality with respondents from the 
other republics in that they felt low levels of ethnic tension in their daily lives. 
 Data from the Consortium of Social Research Institutes of Yugoslavia interviewed of 
13,000 Yugoslavians in 1989 and 1990 on their tolerance towards other Yugoslav ethnicities 
(Hodson 1994, 1544). The findings provide a range of opinions in Yugoslavia. While Bosnia-
Herzegovina was the most tolerant of all the republics, the autonomous province of Kosovo 
was the least tolerant. The autonomous province of Vojvodina had a high degree of tolerance 
among its residents, just behind Bosnia-Herzegovina. Montenegro was slightly more tolerant 
than Serbia while Slovenia and Macedonia were less tolerant (1548). This data provides a 
wealth of information on the range of opinions in Yugoslavia, but the data does not provide 
specific percentages to the questions asked. Therefore, further research will have to be done 
to obtain a clearing understanding of societal attitudes in Slovenia, Montenegro and 
Macedonia.   
 The first major uprising in Yugoslavia following Tito’s death was the push for more 
autonomy by Albanian Kosovars in 1981. Although the movement was labeled nationalist 
because of the regionalist nature of the protests, the movement was actually prompted more 
by economic factors than cultural animosity among ethnic groups (Dyker 1996, 94). This 
case study indicates how Serbian nationalists were quick to label an economic discontent as 
ethnic tension. 
 Upon the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, the 
leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina initially decided to remain part of Yugoslavia (Bougarel 1996, 
100). In addition to that, a massive peace demonstration took place in Sarajevo the following 
month. The Yutel Concert for Peace in July 1991 drew over 50,000 attendees and thousands 
more demonstrated for peace in the streets of Sarajevo. As late as the summer of 1991, many 
of the attendees at the concert, who were flying Yugoslavian flags and peace signs in an act 
of unity, were under the impression that Bosnia-Herzegovina could still avoid war (ZETRA 
2016). Additional statistics from around that time indicate that 100,000 citizens were 
conscientious objectors to conscription (Braun et al. 2016). The sheer number of participants 
in anti-war demonstrators illustrates that many Bosnians were not inclined towards war and 
the statistics gathered from a nationwide survey further supports this argument.  
 Guest speaker Stefano Costalli in the JMU Balkan lecture series discussed the 
locations throughout Yugoslavia with the most violence. His findings indicated that areas 
consisting of more heterogenous populations were the locations with the most violence 
(Costalli 2017). It is very important, however, to understand that while more ethnically 
heterogeneous areas had a positive correlation with more violence, the citizens in those areas 
were actually more tolerant of their neighbors and consequently less inclined to become 
violent. The citizens of ethnically heterogenous areas of Yugoslavia did not cause more 
violence. Instead, other factors need to be examined in why these areas became more violent 
and what variable could have played a role. 
 Factors of ethnicity including language and religion are widely cited as primary 
causes of the war. Yugoslavia consisted of three primary religions: Orthodox Christianity, 
Roman Catholicism, and Islam. As the data prior data indicates, religious views did not play 
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a major role in relations among ethnic groups in the 1980s. Identity in Yugoslavia based on 
religious lines was actually not widely conceptualized until the 1970s when the Yugoslav 
government added Muslim to the list of nationalities on the federal census (Poulton 1997, 
23). The notion of “imaginary folklore” is described in Muslim Identity and the Balkan State. 
This theory stipulates that elites, through revisionist history, promoted this idea of deep-
rooted hatred among the various religious groups in Yugoslavia (27). While religious 
differences and warfare may have existed in the distant past, religion was not a prominent 
cleavage in society that divided Yugoslavians. 
 Another scholar presents a similar argument on the role of religion and history in the 
Balkans. Ethnic struggles between the Serbs and Croats, which had existed, were dramatized 
by nationalists in the final years of Yugoslavia; “ …in former Yugoslavia, popular 
perceptions of the past are infinitely more important than what may or may not have actually 
taken place” (Bennett 1995, 6). It is quite astonishing that centuries-old historical myths and 
legends prompted such a strong sense of nationalism among Yugoslavians. 
 Following the decision of the Slovenian parliament in September 1989 to incorporate 
language into its constitution for the right to become independent, comedians in the country 
satirized the move in a broadcast seen around the country (Dennich 2000, 39-40). 
“Throughout Yugoslavia, a significant proportion of the population rejected nationalist views 
in favor of maintaining a multiethnic state” (40). This quote demonstrates that many 
Yugoslavians had an awareness of the disconnect between government aspirations and what 
ordinary citizens were in support of. 
 
VI: Path Dependency Theory and the Break Out of Violence 
 The first part of this paper examined societal attitudes among Yugoslav ethnic groups 
in the post-Tito era during the late 1980s and early 1990s. The findings indicate that the vast 
majority of Yugoslavians at that time had a largely positive attitude toward other ethnic 
groups or an indifferent attitude at worst. Very few respondents felt animosity toward other 
Yugoslav ethnic groups. Data from the surveys did indicate, however, that a large percentage 
of Yugoslavians “perceived” that there was a high degree of ethnic tension outside their 
communities. These findings present a puzzle in determining how the citizens of Yugoslavia 
were then capable of the violence that came about beginning in 1991. If citizens of 
Yugoslavia had an overwhelmingly favorable opinion towards the other Yugoslav ethnic 
groups, what then could have caused the citizens to become violent towards one another? 
 The second part of this paper will examine the path dependency theory that can help 
explain how citizens became engaged in violence. Path dependence theory suggests that this 
is a pattern that occurs during regime change and consequently, provided a “window of 
opportunity” for violence to occur. Path-dependence theory seeks to help explain historical 
outcomes by emphasizing the interconnectedness of key events throughout time. The theory 
posits that in order for something to happen, a specific preceding event or condition had to 
first occur. Since similar situations can end with different outcomes, the path-dependence 
theory utilizes the notion of “critical junctures” to illustrates the differences or “trajectories” 
that occur (Koinova 2013, 6-7).  
 In the context of Yugoslavia, “…multiple changes in the political and economic 
environment enabled contingent events to have major consequences” (Koinova 2013, 5). 
Using the path-dependency theory, the chain of events leading to outbreak of violence in 
Yugoslavia will have to be reconstructed followed by examining whether the “critical 
junctures” are able to illustrate how violence was able to occur in some instances. 
 
 Chain of Events in Yugoslavia 
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 Building onto Koinova’s path-dependency theory, the first “critical juncture” was the 
decline of communism in the 1980s (Koinova 2013, 7). When Tito died in 1980, there was an 
initial wave of pessimism if the multiethnic socialist federation would be able to continue. 
Many feared that Yugoslavia would collapse, as Tito was a key figure in maintaining unity 
among the various ethnic groups. The post-Tito leadership was adamant in preserving a 
united, multi-ethnic Yugoslavia in the initial years following Tito’s death and prosecuted any 
dissent in order to maintain unity. The path dependence theory shows that Tito’s death did 
not actually cause a critical juncture in Yugoslavia because Tito’s successors maintained his 
policies thereby preventing a political climate that could have opened to violent actors. As 
noted in the Associated Press newsclip, “Tito’s basic policy line remains unchanged” 
(Associated Press 1981, Roving Report Yugoslavia, 03:00-03:05). At the same time, ethnic 
tensions did become visible following Tito’s death in Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians 
protested the bleak economic conditions in the region. Although the demonstrations did form 
on ethnic lines, the demonstrations themselves were addressing the local economic 
grievances in Kosovo and were not promoting ethnic disunity in Yugoslavia (Associated 
Press 1981, 07:40-08:0). 
 It would be several more years before a chain of events unfolded that resulted in civil 
war in Yugoslavia. Instead of critical juncture forming upon Tito’s death in 1980 or the 
protests in Kosovo in 1981, the critical juncture did not occur until a non-Communist voices 
entered the political field. It was not the decline of communism that fostered violence, rather 
communism’s decline provided a new “window of opportunity” for violent actors to gain 
access onto the political stage. During the Tito years and the immediate years following his 
death “…there were no alternative elites. In the 1980s new elites within the communist 
parties started to emerge” (Koinova 2013, 40). The critical juncture in Yugoslavia was 
therefore not in 1980, but in 1987 with the political shakeup that brought nationalists into 
power over the pro-Yugoslavs. In response to the growing ethnic unrest in Kosovo, an 
ideological split occurred among the Serbian Communist Party. The then-ruler of the Serbian 
Communist Party, Ivan Stambolic, denounced the nationalist rhetoric coming from his own 
party’s opposition and tried to handle the crisis through peaceful negotiations with his 
Kosovar Albanian counterparts. President Stambolic was unable to achieve this goal and 
resigned. This “critical juncture” resulted in a power shift to nationalist faction of the Serbian 
Communist Party led by Slodoban Milosevic (41). 
 Following the path dependence theory, the abandonment of Tito-style communism in 
the mid-1980s enabled the emergence of alternative ideologies within the Serbian Communist 
Party to emerge, which then enabled nationalist politicians to obtain power. It is important to 
emphasize that the abandonment of Tito-style communism did not just result in nationalists 
coming to power. Instead, the abandonment of Tito-style communism allowed for a variety of 
alternative political ideologies to develop on the national political scene. Alternative political 
ideologies emerged in the other Yugoslav republics. In Slovenia, the Communist party did 
not transform into a nationalist party, but rather liberal reformists. 
 The chain of events in Socialist Republic of Slovenia differed considerably from the 
Socialist Republic of Serbia. The same year that Slobodan Milosevic became President of the 
Serbian Communist Party, the reformist Milan Kucan became President of the Slovenian 
Communist Party (121-122). This was a “critical juncture” in Slovenia’s history as  “[t]he 
ascent of the liberal wing was a key development in the Slovenian ‘proto-transition’…that 
shaped the path to liberalism” (Boduszynski 2010, 121). Using the path dependence 
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approach, the 1986 power shift of the Slovenian Communist Party was a key event that great 
affected the outcome of Slovenia in the early 1990s. Had the power shift also turned 
nationalist in Slovenia in 1986, instead of liberal, Slovenia’s path may have been more in line 
with Serbia’s. Evidence of Slovenia’s reforms was apparent in its press. In the latter half of 
the 1980s, Slovenia strayed from Titoism in allowing freedom of the press that challenged 
Yugoslav policies. The magazine Mladina became an outspoken critic of Yugoslav and 
Milosevic’s policies (Percy 1995, 31:15-31:45). 
 The decline of Titoism ushered in the emergence of alternative voices, which led to 
two very different outcomes, a nationalist Serbia and a liberal Slovenia. In keeping with the 
path dependency theory, these two conditions are essential in the next piece of the puzzle: the 
transformation from a peaceful society to a violent one. Until 1991, ethnic violence had not 
yet erupted into warfare, but the critical junctures of the path dependence theory enabled 
violence to break out. 
 Outbreak of Violence in Slovenia 
 The initial warfare that broke out in Yugoslavia was not in nationalist Serbia, but in 
liberal Slovenia. Slovenia had paid close attention to the developments on the ethnic situation 
in Kosovo and in 1989 there was widespread condemnation of Serbia’s “domination in 
Kosovo” (Associated Press 1989a, 00:30-00:45). The Slovenian leader Milan Kucan foresaw 
that Serbia’s growing power throughout Yugoslavia put Slovenia at risk (Percy 1995, 23:55-
24:30). Relations further diminished between the Slovenian and Serbian republics in January 
1990 at the 14th Yugoslav Communist Party Congress. When upset with the Serbian 
delegation’s behavior, the Slovene delegation of the Yugoslavian Communist Party walked 
out (44:00-44:45). Slovenia’s political objectives had strayed so far from Serbia’s that 
Slovenia saw it in its best interest to sever its ties with the Yugoslav Communist Party. 
 The declaration of secession is what ultimately triggered the outbreak violence in 
Slovenia. The Yugoslav People’s Army quickly moved troops in from Belgrade to stop the 
secession. After ten days of fighting, the European Community, Yugoslavia, and Slovenia 
brokered a 90-day ceasefire to put an end to all the violence (Wilmer 2002, 46-47). The first 
instance of warfare to break out in Yugoslavia was in Slovenia, though the case of Slovenia 
presents a separate narrative to the other Yugoslav republics. While ethnicity may have 
played some role in the Ten-Day War, the actual warfare that took place in Slovenia involved 
very few civilians and was mainly fought between the Yugoslav’s People Army and 
separatists in the newly-formed Slovenian military. The example of Slovenia shows that 
ethnic hatred played almost no role in this conflict. Therefore, the critical juncture that 
occurred in Slovenia in 1986 and the subsequent actions to liberalize instead of nationalize 
demonstrate the validity of the path-dependence theory in this argument. 
 Outbreak of Violence in Croatia 
 In contrast to Slovenia, the violence in Croatia was more severe. Serb areas of Croatia 
had actually begun to reject Croatian control in what became known as the “log revolution” 
(Glardic 2011, 193). The Socialist Republic of Serbia was instrumental in this affair as the 
Serbian State Security Service “armed and trained” the Serb Croat revolt (193). Instead of 
trying to secede from Yugoslavia altogether, the Serb Croats were instead looking to unite 
with the Socialist Republic of Serbia. 
 Croatia was not immune to the changes occurring elsewhere in Yugoslavia during the 
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1980s. While the League of Communists of Croatia did not pivot to the degree seen in 
Slovenia, alternative voices did enter the political scene in the late 1980s. Croatia’s critical 
juncture, however, did not occur until 1990, when the republic held its first multiparty 
elections (Gagnon 2004, 136). The election resulted in a victory for the Croatian Democratic 
Union, (HDZ), (136). This meant a departure from communism and the emergence of 
nationalism. The new leader of Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, (138). Tudjman’s political party 
contained a radical nationalist faction with an anti-Serb agenda. This wing of the party 
contained members loyal to the former “Ustasa”, a fascist organization that collaborated with 
the Nazis during World War II (138). Aware of the radical elements in his party, Tudjman 
was able to distance himself, and it was his watered-down nationalism attracted the most 
voters (138). Given that nationalism did exist in Croatia, more so than in Slovenia, but less 
powerful than in Serbia, the degree of violence seen in Croatia was in between the level seen 
in Slovenia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 The 1990 “Log Revolution” was the first instance of violence in Croatia. Unlike the 
Ten-Day War in Slovenia in 1991 with low civilian involvement, Croatia eventually fell into 
civil war. Like other republics in Yugoslavia, Croatia was also subjected to increasing pro-
Serbian propaganda (Gagnon 2004, 136). Many Serb Croats living in the republic felt 
alienated by the new Croatian government, which used the same nationalist symbols used by 
the Croatian government that collaborated with the Nazis during World War II (Percy 1995, 
52:00-53:20). In reaction to this sentiment, President Tudjman stated that all ethnic groups in 
Croatia would be treaty equally (138). Despite the fact that Croatian Democratic Union had 
far-right elements in its party, the majority of Croatians separated the mainly moderate 
nationalist makeup of the party from the extreme fringe and continued to support equal rights 
for Serb Croats. (154-156). The ambiguity surrounding the Croatian symbolism and its 
nationalism in general was nonetheless used by Serbia to fulfill its own agenda of taking 
control over Serb areas in Croatia. Warfare then broke out between the Croatia and Yugoslav 
People’s Army (Percy 1995, 1:35:00-1:35:45).  
 Outbreak of Violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 Bosnia-Herzegovina suffered the most violence of any of the Yugoslav republics. The 
republic consisted of three main ethnic groups: Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Serbs, and 
Bosnian Croats. Unlike the leadership in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnian leaders were still 
negotiating future ties with Yugoslavia into 1992. Without Slovenia and Croatia in the 
federation, Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic concluded that Serbia would dwarf Bosnia-
Herzegovina in a smaller Yugoslavia and therefore called for a referendum to take place on 
independence on February 29, 1992 (Glardic 2011, 289). 
 The referendum resulted in an overwhelming vote for independence, though Bosnian 
Serbs had boycotted the referendum. This became a “critical juncture” in the future of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as the referendum was followed by civilian violence (Glardic 2011, 
292). After a Bosnian Muslim killed a Bosnian Serb at a wedding in Sarajevo, the city and 
republic immediately broke out in widespread ethnic violence. Using the death of the 
Bosnian Serb, SDS Party Chairman Kardzic demanded the deployment of Serb paramilitaries 
in Sarajevo. These paramilitary groups quickly engaged in fighting and sought to obtain as 
much territory as possible for the Bosnian Serbs throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Violence in 
the Balkans reached a new level when Serb paramilitary groups engaged in ethnic cleansing 
by massacring Bosnian Muslim areas as was done in March and April 1992 in the Bosnian 
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town of Bijeljina (296). The horrors that unfolded in Bosnia continued until the Dayton 
Agreement was signed in late 1995 and brought an end to the war. 
 Outbreak of Violence in Kosovo 
 The outbreak of violence in Kosovo differs considerably from the chronology of 
violence in the aforementioned Yugoslav republics. Path dependency can help explain this 
phenomenon through the key political events that occurred in the province. These key events 
in Kosovo were dramatically different from Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
consequently the timelines of events differs as well. 
 Although war broke out in Kosovo last, ethnic tensions were first heightened in this 
part of Yugoslavia. In 1981, one year after Tito’s death, student demonstrators in Kosovo 
protested the poor economic conditions. In addition, some protestors also demanded that the 
semiautonomous province become a Yugoslav republic and share the same degree of 
autonomy as the six republics (Bieber 2003, 2). As the decade progressed, Kosovar Serbs 
increasingly claimed that they were being discriminated against and filed reports of defaced 
churches and being violently attacked (15). Whatever tension or discrimination that may have 
existed, Slobodan Milosevic, the new President of the Serbia, used this tense social 
environment as a window of opportunity to fulfill his nationalist agenda of creating a 
“Greater Serbia”. Amidst civil unrest in Kosovo, the Serbian parliament revoked the 
autonomous status of Kosovo in March 1989 (Vetter 1999, 543-544). This was a critical 
juncture for Kosovo as the majority-Albanian population there was no longer able to use 
political institutions and mechanisms to gain greater autonomy or participate meaningfully in 
local affairs. 
 After war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, fear increased among Kosovar Albanians 
that Serbs would wage war on them next (Associated Press 1992, 04:45-05:00). By fall 1992, 
societal conditions had reached an all time low in Kosovo as ethnic Albanians were banned 
from attending school. The Serb-dominated government, which had overturned Kosovo’s 
autonomous status three years prior, made it difficult and politically not feasible for ethnic 
Albanians to protest (00:00-00:35). The general atmosphere in Kosovo during the early and 
mid-1990s was one of a police state where Albanian Kosovars were attacked and monitored 
as a method of intimidation to any dissent against the Serb-dominated government (00:45-
01:30). Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo during this time escape the 
Serbian ethnic cleansing policy (04:50-05:05). 
 The situation changed in Kosovo during the mid-1990s after the Dayton Accords 
were signed in late 1995. While the Dayton Accords brought peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
the accords were adamantly opposed by many Kosovar Albanians, who believed that the 
treaty would keep the territorial boundaries of Yugoslavia intact. This critical juncture in 
Kosovo resulted in the mobilization of ethnic Albanians into an underground organization 
known as the Kosova Liberation Army who aimed to achieve Kosovar independence through 
violent means. After international peace talks failed, NATO intervened in Yugoslavia in 1999 
and brought the war to a close after three months of military engagement (Bieber 2003, 41). 
Estimates indicate that more than 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed in the war and 
hundreds of thousands more displaced (Vetter 1999, 568). 
The Emotional Component to Path Dependency Theory 
 
 The path dependency theory has thus far explained how the political environment 
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changed in Yugoslavia, and consequently, how nationalism was able to permeate throughout 
the country. The rise of nationalist leaders cannot fully explain how the country erupted in 
violence as civilians, and not just politicians and the military, engaged in the violence. 
Building upon the path dependency theory, schismogenesis was the development of the 
hostile social environment created by the rise of nationalist leaders. 
 Schismogenesis 
 
 Following the political upheaval and chain of events in Serbia in 1987, Milosevic’s 
rise coincided with the rise in nationalist media. Using the media to his advantage, Milosevic 
systematically changed the nature of popular media outlets through personnel changes and 
reorganization, as was the case with the Serbian newspaper Politika and the television station 
Radio Televizija Beograd (Bozik-Roberson 2005, 400). What were originally considered 
reputable sources, media outlets such as Radio Televizija Beograd, became mouthpieces for 
Serb nationalist propaganda (401-402). The shift in media in Serbian society to nationalist 
propaganda created an environment where “…the psycho-cultural power of ethnicity is 
turned into a source of hatred and stereotyping that can ultimately be mobilized into a violent 
conflict” (405). 
 Nationalist propaganda throughout the other Yugoslav republics during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. Tudjman’s nationalist government in Croatia embarked on a renaming 
policy in 1990 with the dismantling of Titoist references in favor of Croatian symbolism, 
much of which had fascist “Ustashe” connotations that aimed to further divide Croats and 
Serbs (Dennich 2000, 52-53). This policy by the new government in Croatia is another 
example of elite-driven “schismogenesis” that unfortunately led into future armed 
mobilization in Croatia. 
 
 Armed Mobilization 
 
 Taking human emotions into account, armed mobilization theory follows the negative 
hostile social environment created through “schismogenesis”. As noted in Stefano Costalli’s 
article on armed mobilization, “…political scientists have (re)discovered the importance of 
introducing ideas and emotions into explanations for internal armed conflict” (Costalli and 
Ruggeri 2015, 119). Path dependency explains the descent into violence in Yugoslavia by 
showing the rise in nationalist leadership, but it cannot explain how Yugoslavian citizens 
became engaged in violence. Therefore, schismogenesis helps explain how the nationalist 
leadership negatively Yugoslavian society. After the negative environment was created 
through schismogenesis, it negatively affects human emotions. 
 In the case of Yugoslavia, many citizens of the country developed the feeling of 
indignation. This feeling differs from anger in that the emotion causes citizens to react 
against society at large instead of a single person of perpetrator. Those consumed with 
indignation therefore feel that they are defending and acting on behalf of those who are 
thought to have been victimized (128). Indignation, however, does not fully explain the 
breakout in violence as Costalli’s article explains that those subjected to the “unfair” 
environment must adhere to a new ideology that calls for violence against the “aggressors” 
(129). 
 Armed mobilization is the final step in how Yugoslavia evolved from a peaceful 
society to one consumed by violent conflict. Like the aforementioned path dependency 
theory, schismogenesis and armed mobilization theories also illustrate the path needed for 
violence to break out. In the case of the armed mobilization theory, a feeling of indignation 
that evolves into ideological revenge helps explain the descent to violence and civil war in a 
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country. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The path dependency theory, augmented by schismogenesis and armed mobilization 
theory conveys how Yugoslavia went from a peaceful society to a violent one in such a short 
period of time. 
 The path dependency theory, which looks at the “critical junctures” in Yugoslavia’s 
political leadership, illustrates how Yugoslavian society abandoned Titoism in favor of other 
political ideologies. The departure of Titoism was not a resurfacing of ethnic tensions, but 
rather an introduction of a variety of ideologies in Yugoslavia. While nationalism became 
dominant in Serbia and Croatia, the case studies indicate that a shift to liberalism in Slovenia 
and a commitment Yugoslav unity in Bosnia-Herzegovina until the referendum on 
independence in 1992. Path dependency and the case study of Kosovo illustrate how the 
delay in major political leadership changes in Kosovo ultimately delayed the outbreak of 
violence in that region until the late 1990s. 
 Because the Balkan Wars of the 1990s involved not only government and military 
officials, schismogenesis adds to the path dependency approach in explaining how the 
nationalist political environment affected Yugoslavian citizens. In addition, armed 
mobilization theory ultimately explains the change in human emotions that shifted ethnic 
relations from hostile to violent. 
 In conclusion, path dependency accurately illustrates how the change in political 
leadership in the various republics of the SFRY towards nationalism shows a positive 
correlation in the amount of violence experienced by that republic in the 1990s. This paper 
also shows how cultural differences such as language and religion played very little role in 
these conflicts, not only because of surveys documented in the late 1980s, but also because of 
how path dependency led to an environment of schismogenesis and eventually armed 
mobilization. 
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Appendix: 
Path Dependency in Yugoslavia 
League of Communists of Slovenia 
 January 1990: League of Communists of Slovenia gives up its monopoly. Slovenia 
 severs ties with the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Vetter 1999). 
 4 February 1990. League of Communists of Slovenia becomes Party of Democratic 
 Reform (544) 
 7 March 1990 Socialist Republic of Slovenia becomes Rep. of Slovenia (544) 
 8 April 1990/22 April 1990: Multiparty elections in Slovenia. Milan Kucan becomes 
 president with 58% of popular vote. (544) 
 June 1991: Slovenia proclaims independence from Yugoslavia (547) 
League of Communists of Serbia 
 May 1986 – 3 September 1987: Ivan Stambolic (Titoist) is President of Serbia 
 (Wetter, 542) 
 3 September 1987: Slobodan Milosevic (Nationalist) becomes President of Serbia 
 through an internal party election (542). 
 16 July 1990: Slobodan Milosevic renames League of Communists of Serbia, which 
 becomes Socialist Party of Serbia, and maintains position (545). 
 
League of Communists in Croatia 
 22-23 April/6-7 May 1990: After two rounds of elections, Franjo Tudjman of the 
 Croatian Democratic Party (nationalist) becomes president of Croatia (Vetter, 544) 
 June 1991: Croatia proclaims independence from Yugoslavia (547) 
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League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 November 1990: Multiparty elections on ethnic lines. Izetbegovic becomes Bosnian 
 President (545-546) 
 29 February 1992: Bosnia-Herzegovina referendum (549) 
 1 March 1992: Violence begins after Serb shot and killed (549) 
 3 March 1992: Bosnia-Herzegovina proclaims independence (549) 
Kosovo 
 March 1989: Kosovo loses semiautonomous status (Vetter 1999, 543-544). 
 1995: Dayton Agreement raises unrest in Kosovo and coincides with the creation of 
 the Kosova Liberation Army (Bieber 2003, 41). 
 
 
